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Money or mental health: the cost of alleviating
psychological distress with monetary
compensation versus psychological therapy
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Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
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School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Abstract : Money is the default way in which intangible losses, such as pain
and suffering, are currently valued and compensated in law courts. Economists
have suggested that subjective well-being regressions can be used to guide
compensation payouts for psychological distress following traumatic life
events. We bring together studies from law, economic, psychology and medical
journals to show that alleviating psychological distress through psychological
therapy could be at least 32 times more cost effective than financial
compensation. This result is not only important for law courts but has
important implications for public health. Mental health is deteriorating across
the world – improvements to mental health care might be a more efficient way
to increase the health and happiness of our nations than pure income growth.
Putting a price tag on ‘pain and suffering’ seems an impossible task but judges in
law courts are regularly expected to make such decisions. Equating money with
an intangible loss may seem peculiar but in tort law an individual who has suffered
should, as nearly as possible, be restored to the same position had they not
sustained some wrong (Lunney and Oliphant, 2008). In law courts monetary
compensation is the expected remedy and there are established monetary
guidelines to compensate for the ‘pain and suffering’ of various injuries (Mackay
et al., 2006). In the UK, the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 provides a one off
payment for the ‘bereavement’ of family members. Economists have developed
a method to place monetary values on various life events (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and
van Praag, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Powdthavee, 2008). It has
further been suggested that such monetary values could be offered as compen-
sation to help overcome psychological distress after particularly traumatic life
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events (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a, 2008b). The economists’ calculations
would suggest that court settlements would need to be much higher than present
to fully compensate an individual. The high monetary values reflect money’s
ineffectiveness at compensating someone for pain and suffering.
We assess the evidence across law, economic, psychology and medical journals
and suggest psychological therapy as an alternative. Psychological therapy
would be substantially more cost effective than financial compensation at alle-
viating psychological distress. We extend our argument beyond the law courts and
suggest that moneys low importance in achieving mental health has important
implications for public health. National happiness levels have remained flat in
developed countries in spite of large economic gains. Mental health, on the other
hand, appears to have been deteriorating across the world for some time and is
estimated to deteriorate still further (Michaud et al., 2001). The comprehen-
siveness and accessibility of mental health services, in particular the provision of
psychological therapies in publicly funded services, have regularly been questioned.
Increasing the investment in mental health and generally broadening access,
therefore, might be a more efficient way to increase the health and happiness of
our nations than pure income growth.
Money: a common metric for valuing life events and the movement
towards compensation
Monetary values have been calculated across numerous areas of life including;
marriage (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), social relationships (Powdthavee,
2008), the fear of crime (Moore and Shepherd, 2006), noise (Van Praag and
Baarsma, 2005), health (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag, 2002) and disabilities
(Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008b). The income equivalences attached to such
events are typically large. For example, the value of a marriage is estimated to be
equivalent to having an extra $100,000 (around £70,000 at today’s exchange
rate) each year (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). Such values have been calcu-
lated using subjective well-being data and computation is relatively simple. The
average impact of some life event on an individual’s well-being can be determined
statistically across a large sample. This impact is then compared to the effect that
income has on an individual’s well-being. Typically, a one standard deviation rise
in income would be expected to induce a rise in well-being of between 0.17 and
0.21 standard deviations (Lucas and Dyrenforth, 2006). By comparing the two
effects researchers can estimate how much extra income an individual would need
on average to achieve an equivalent level of well-being as the life event.
Compensation for injustices is an important aspect of society. In tort cases,
particularly those involving psychological distress, judges are commonly faced
with the dilemma of awarding compensation to restore an individual to the
position they were before any injustice took place. Such a decision is mostly
subjective, arbitrary and normally takes the form of a one off monetary payment
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(Mackay et al., 2006). Some researchers have suggested that the psycholo-
gical impact of particularly traumatic life events can be evaluated in purely
financial terms (Clark and Oswald, 2002). With the aim of alleviating
psychological distress recent studies have suggested that such figures could
be useful in a court of law to guide compensation payouts for individuals
who have lost family members (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a) or become
disabled (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008b).
Such events can devastate the lives of individuals and the sums suggested to
help alleviate the psychological distress are large, much larger than those presently
awarded by courts. For example, were an individual to lose a partner, then it is
suggested that a compensation amount ranging from £114,000–£206,000 per
annum would be needed to overcome psychological distress. For the loss of a child,
individuals would require anything from £89,000–£140,000 to compensate
(Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a). In the UK the Fatal Accidents Act 1976
recommends a substantially lower payout of just £10,000. If such a financial
compensatory argument were extended to unemployment, which is well known to
have deep psychological effects beyond the simple loss of income (Darity and
Goldsmith, 1996), the income equivalence of psychological distress alone would be
in the region of £34,000–£59,000 per annum (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a).
The clinical and cost effectiveness of psychological therapy
Researchers have assessed the clinical and cost effectiveness of various treatments
for depressed patients (Bower et al., 2000, Ward et al., 2000). The effectiveness of
general practitioner care with both cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) and non-
directive counselling were all compared. Over 12 months all treatments reduced
average depression levels by at least one and a half standard deviations. The average
total cost, which even included indirect costs such as work time lost, was less than
£1,500. In fact, the improvement was achieved by both CBT and non-directive
counselling within the first four months at a total cost of less than £800.
A cost effectiveness comparison between psychological therapy and
direct financial compensation
Comparing the cost effectiveness of psychotherapy and direct financial com-
pensation in alleviating individuals from severe psychological distress has not
been carried out before. There are several ways in which the costs between
psychological therapy and direct financial compensation can be compared using
the studies already outlined. Oswald and Powdthavee (2008a) estimate that the
average psychological impact of losing a partner is about one standard devia-
tion. They suggest that the individual would need to be compensated with at
least £114,000. Pro-rata it would cost less than £600 to help the individual
adjust to such a difficult life event using psychological therapy. Similarly for
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unemployment, which has deep psychological consequences, it would be more
cost effective to provide individuals with psychological therapy (around
£100–£200 pro-rata) to overcome their loss of purpose in life and help them
back to work rather than solely offering financial compensation.
To compare the costs in another way; psychological therapy alleviates psy-
chological distress by one and a half standard deviations at a cost of £800 over
4 months. To achieve a one and a half standard deviation reduction in psycho-
logical distress using money alone would require (based on estimates in Oswald
and Powdthavee (2008a) and dependant on the statistical technique) somewhere
in the region of £179,000–£292,000 of extra income every year. This illustrates
that the alleviation of severe psychological distress could be worth at least
£179,000 of extra income each year and suggests that financial compensation is
an inefficient way of helping individuals overcome distress.
The wide disparity between the effects of psychological therapy and income
arises out of the poor ability of income to improve mental health. However,
income’s effect on psychological distress in studies such as Oswald and Powd-
thavee (2008a) is likely to be under estimated. More realistic income effects can
be obtained by allocating income randomly to individuals and observing the
effects on individuals’ lives. Such an experiment is not possible but researchers
have analyzed longitudinally the effect of medium sized lottery wins on psycho-
logical distress. An average lottery or pool win of £4,300 is found to bring
approximately a quarter of a standard deviation improvement to mental health
two years after the win (Gardner and Oswald, 2007). This suggests that even
when the best income-psychological distress estimates are considered (Gardner
and Oswald, 2007), psychological therapy is still calculated to be at least 32 times
more cost effective than financial compensation. This figure is large and places
huge questions on the use of income as an effective compensation method.
Our argument is not without its limitations. There are of course inherent
difficulties in making inferences across studies and just like the proponents of the
use of monetary compensation it is necessary to draw some conclusions from
one group of individuals to another.1 The evidence on the cost-effectiveness
of psychological therapy is not based exclusively on individuals experiencing
loss as a result of a devastating life event. Some psychological distress will
undoubtedly follow from the loss of a loved one but one may question whether,
what could be considered a fairly normal response, would benefit from psy-
chological therapy. This perhaps calls into question the purpose of psychological
treatment more generally. One view of psychological therapy is that mental
health is a continuum and that everyone, no matter their level of psychological
distress, can benefit from psychological therapy. Under this view any psychological
1 The argument for using subjective well-being measures to calculate monetary compensation levels
must necessarily assume that the effect of income on psychological distress, based on estimates from the
entire sample, will be the same for the small sub-sample who have recently lost a family member.
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distress would be viewed as mental disorder and therefore treatable. Another
viewpoint is that mental disorder is dichotomous, in that individuals either
have mental disorder or do not. This view suggests that mental disorder is the
presence of distorted thought processes that can result in protracted psycho-
logical distress. In this latter view the psychological distress that arises as a normal
reaction to loss might not be seen as directly treatable. However, it is likely that,
without adequate support, some unnecessary mental disorder will arise from the
loss. Therapy should aim to avert such mental disorder. Additionally, even if
there were a substantial cost difference in helping individuals with loss and those
with mental disorders, the cost-effectiveness comparison figure calculated earlier
should be high enough to absorb any extra expense.
A further issue that requires some discussion is the process of adaptation.
People adapt to many of life’s events (Brickman et al., 1978; Clark et al., 2008)
and some individuals will naturally return to their baseline level of psychological
functioning given time. If individuals adapt anyway then an argument could
be made against the use of psychological therapy. The same argument, however,
could be made against the use of monetary compensation, the current default
method of addressing loss. In any case individuals do not always fully adapt
and even if they did resources should be used in the most efficient manner to
relieve psychological distress in the interim. Oswald and Powdthavee (2008b)
address the issue of adaptation and as such suggest that annual compensatory
amounts should be reduced each year. Similarly, psychological therapy could be
proportionally reduced to help with the lower levels of distress in later years
after an event. However, it may turn out that psychological therapy, focusing
directly on psychological distress, speeds up the process of adaptation and may
even make therapy unnecessary in later years.
Practical implications of our argument: for judges
In tort law an individual who has suffered should, as nearly as possible, be
restored to the same position they had not sustained some wrong. The loss of
future earnings must undoubtedly be compensated financially. The evidence
suggests that following a devastating life event an individual is likely to
experience an adverse psychological reaction and our concern is with the
efficiency of compensating such an intangible and fairly normal psycholo-
gical reaction financially. Currently, monetary compensation seems to be
unquestionably taken in law courts as the only way of helping an individual
overcome psychological distress after a traumatic event. The values currently
offered as compensation are arbitrary (Mackay et al., 2006) and, according
to economists’ subjective well-being equations, should actually be much
higher (Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008a, 2008b). Rather than giving individuals
more income to cope with distress it seems sensible to consider other alternatives
such as psychological therapy.
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Can bestowing an individual with money really be expected to help an
individual with psychological distress after a traumatic life event? As a
compensatory device, money, like most things, can never truly fulfill such a
role. The purpose of financial compensation, however, is to alleviate an
individual’s psychological distress by helping them to find enjoyment else-
where. Thus, if a tool is judged by its ability to alleviate an individual’s
psychological distress then the answer may be found in medical research. We
have shown that psychological therapy could be much more cost effective
than financial compensation. We are not claiming that psychological therapy
will entirely prevent what could be considered as a normal adverse psycho-
logical reaction but therapy may provide some short-term relief. Moreover,
such devastating life events if not adequately dealt with may lead to mala-
daptive thoughts and result in undue distress. It is unlikely that financial
compensation will protect against such maladaptive thinking.
On punitive grounds we are not necessarily suggesting that large court payouts
are not justified.2 However, we are suggesting that the sums currently offered
may not be the best way to help the injured party overcome any psychological
distress unless it is decreed, in the best interests of the injured party, that the
money gets spent on some form of psychological therapy. There is currently no
legal obligation for individuals to undertake steps to alleviate their psycho
logical distress. However, there is some legal support in New Zealand for an
increased use of psychological therapy to help individuals overcome psycho
logical distress that occurs due to the actions of a third party. The Injury
Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act of 2001 requires that the cost
of psychological therapy be borne by the state.
Financial compensation may not even have the causal effect on a traumatized
individual in the way that economists suggest. Additionally, individuals are likely
to be unequally affected by financial compensation; for example, due to the
diminishing marginal utility of income wealthier individuals may require even more
income to replenish lost well-being. Financial compensation seems like a poor
device for alleviating psychological distress. In contrast psychological therapy does
not attempt to act as compensation but instead focuses directly on helping indivi-
duals to overcome their loss. Psychological therapy acknowledges that trauma is
person dependent and is therefore effective, inexpensive and compassionate.
Practical implications of our argument: for policy makers and society
We believe our argument has important implications for public health. The high
levels of financial compensation that economists suggest help to highlight how
2 There are several theories concerning the purpose of tort, these include: deterrence, corrective
justice, risk allocation and distribution of loss. Some, depending on the legal system, would argue that
retribution also plays an important part.
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inefficient money is at alleviating psychological distress and generally improving
individual well-being. Economists are puzzled as to why developed societies are
becoming no happier in spite of large income gains (Easterlin, 1995). However,
in 1999 unipolar major depression was the fifth leading cause of the disease
burden and by 2020 major depression is expected to rise to the second biggest
burden (Michaud et al., 2001). These conflicting findings, along with the evidence
presented here, indicate that although income growth may provide some benefit
to well-being, the greatest benefit to the health and happiness of our nations
could come from improving access to mental health care.
Our argument, although clearly comparing across studies and extending from
the law courts to wider society, adds a new perspective to public health debate
on mental health. Regarding the UK’s National Health Service, Richard Layard
(2006) has suggested that the cost of helping individuals overcome mental health
issues using psychological therapy more than outweighs the money saved from
reducing the individuals on benefits who are incapacitated by their mental
health. Our argument adds further support for increasing the availability of
mental health resources by instead suggesting that mental health in its own
right is something to be valued alongside economic progress. The importance of
improving mental health for national well-being needs to be further recognized
and policy makers must consider improving mental health care further. Indivi-
duals are also probably not fully aware of the powerful effects that good
psychological therapy can have on their mental health and general well-being.
It needs to be understood that aspiring to good mental health can often be
more important than aspiring to high income for well-being. Since individuals
are unlikely to unilaterally invest in their own mental health there is a strong
case for public provision.
Acknowledgements
For helpful discussions and advice the authors are grateful to Gordon Brown, Anna
Cunningham, Stephen Joseph, Paul Raffield, Andrew Oswald and two anonymous
referees. The Economic and Social Research Council and the Institute of Advanced
Study at the University of Warwick provided research support. The usual disclaimer
applies.
References
Blanchflower, D. G. and A. J. Oswald (2004), ‘Well-being over time in Britain and the USA’,
Journal of Public Economics, 88(7–8): 1359–1386.
Bower, P., S. Byford, B. Sibbald, E. Ward, M. King, R. Lloyd and M. Gabbay (2000),
‘Randomized controlled trial of non-directive counselling, cognitive-behaviour therapy,
and usual general practitioner care for patients with depression. II: Cost effectiveness’,
British Medical Journal, 321(7273): 1389–1392.
Money or mental health 515
Brickman, P., D. Coates and R. Janoffbulman (1978), ‘Lottery winners and accident victims –
is happiness relative?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(8): 917–927.
Clark, A. E., E. Diener, Y. Georgellis and R. E. Lucas (2008), ‘Lags and leads in life satis-
faction: a test of the baseline hypothesis’, Economic Journal, 118(529): F222–F243.
Clark, A. E. and A. J. Oswald (2002), ‘A simple statistical method for measuring how life
events affect happiness’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 31(6): 1139–1144.
Darity, W. and A. H. Goldsmith (1996), ‘Social psychology, unemployment and macro-
economics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1): 121–140.
Easterlin, R. A. (1995), ‘Will raising the incomes of all increases the happiness of all?’,
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 27(1): 35–47.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. and B. M. S. van Praag (2002), ‘The subjective costs of health losses
due to chronic diseases. An alternative model for monetary appraisal’, Health Eco-
nomics,, 11(8): 709–722.
Gardner, J. and A. J. Oswald (2007), ‘Money and mental wellbeing: a longitudinal study of
medium-sized lottery wins’, Journal of Health Economics, 26(1): 49–60.
Layard, R. (2006), ‘Health policy – the case for psychological treatment centres’, British
Medical Journal, 332(7548): 1030–1032.
Lucas, R. E. and P. S. Dyrenforth (2006), ‘Does the existence of social relationships matter
for subjective well-being?’, in E. J. Finkel, and K. D. Vohs eds, Self and Relationships:
Connecting Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Processes, New York, NY, USA: Guildford
Press.
Lunney, M. and K. Oliphant (2008), Tort Law: Text and Materials, New York, USA: Oxford
University Press.
Mackay, J., M. Bruffell, J. Cherry, A. Hughes and M. Tillett (2006), Guidelines for the
Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases, New York, USA: Oxford
University Press.
Michaud, C. M., C. J. L. Murray and B. R. Bloom (2001), ‘Burden of disease: Implications for
future research’, JAMA-Journal of the American Medical Association, 285(5):
535–539.
Moore, S. and J. P. Shepherd (2006), ‘The cost of fear: shadow pricing the intangible costs of
crime’, Applied Economics, 38(3): 293–300.
Oswald, A. J. and N. Powdthavee (2008a), ‘Death, happiness, and the calculation of com-
pensatory damages’, Journal of Legal Studies, 37: S217–S251.
Oswald, A. J. and N. Powdthavee (2008b), ‘Does happiness adapt? A longitudinal study of
disability with implications for economists and judges’, Journal of Public Economics,
92(5–6): 1061–1077.
Powdthavee, N. (2008), ‘Putting a price tag on friends, relatives, and neighbours: using
surveys of life satisfaction to value social relationships’, Journal of Socio-Economics,
37: 1459–1480.
Van Praag, B. M. S. and B. E. Baarsma (2005), ‘Using happiness surveys to value intangibles:
the case of airport noise’, Economic Journal, 115(500): 224–246.
Ward, E., M. King, M. Lloyd, P. Bower, B. Sibbald, S. Farrelly, M. Gabbay, N. Tarrier and
J. Addington-Hall (2000), ‘Randomized controlled trial of non-directive counselling,
cognitive-behaviour therapy, and usual general practitioner care for patients with
depression. I: Clinical effectiveness’, British Medical Journal, 321(7273): 1383–1388.
516 C H R I S T O P H E R B O Y C E A N D A L E X W O O D
